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Abstract. In his 1994 paper, neuroscientist Benjamin Libet affirmed that he found a way 
to test the interaction between the mind and the brain. He believed that this proce-
dure would also test the reality of a non-physical mind, emerging from neural activity. 
In 2000 John Searle objected to Libet’s evident dualism, affirming that the mind is not 
a hypothesis to test but a datum to be explained. According to Searle, Libet’s problem 
arose from accepting the Cartesian distinction of ‘mind’ and ‘body’, obsolete catego-
ries from an old philosophy. Searle’s solution implied the rejection both of dualism 
and reductive materialism, suggesting a non-reductive materialism. This first-person 
ontology, as Searle calls it, aims at preserving, against reductive materialism, the es-
sential features of consciousness, i.e. subjective, qualitative and unified. Searle argued, 
however, that the nature of consciousness remained biological. Dan Zahavi’s thesis is 
that a phenomenological approach to the self and consciousness can offer a comple-
menting alternative to the contemporary comprehension of the nature of consciousness. 
Engaged in an open dialogue with neuroscience and cognitive science in his dealings 
with consciousness, Zahavi holds, nonetheless, that this notion cannot be completely 
understood without reference to the notion of the self. Thus, this paper will analyse 
Zahavi’s ideas about the self and consciousness in Subjectivity and Selfhood (2005) as 
to evaluate whether his phenomenological approach is able to overcome the materi-
alist tones of Searle’s philosophy of mind, opening the possibility of a non-reductive 
comprehension of human beings.
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Introduction
The past couple of decades have increasingly shown scientifically informed 
philosophical and theological discussions surrounding the nature of con-
sciousness and its relation to the brain – the mind/body problem –, within the 
analytic and phenomenological traditions. Neuroscientist Benjamin Libet, 
for example, designed in 1994 an experiment to explain their relationship 
suggesting the existence of a non-physical conscious mental field (CMF) 
with causal powers over neural activity (Libet 1994). Libet invites us to 
consider the possibility of the following experiment to demonstrate the 
existence of the CMF: 
If local areas of cerebral cortex could independently contribute to or alter the 
larger, unitary CMF, it should be possible to demonstrate such contributions 
when (a) that cortical area is completely isolated or cut off from neuronal com-
munication with the rest of the brain, but (b) the area remains in situ, alive and 
kept functioning in some suitable manner that sufficiently resembles its normal 
behaviour. The experimental prediction to be tested would be as follows: Suitable 
electrical and/or chemical activation of the isolated tissue should produce or 
affect a conscious experience, even though the tissue has no neural connections 
to the rest of the brain. Possibilities of spread of influences from the isolated 
block via physical non-neural paths (e.g. electric current flow) would have to 
be controlled for. If a subjective experience is induced and reportable within 
a second or so, that would tend to exclude spread by chemical diffusion or by 
changes in vascular circulation or in contents of circulating blood as a cause. 
[…] A slab of cerebral cortex can be neurally isolated surgically, remaining 
in place but viable by retaining its blood supply as the only connection with 
the rest of the brain. This is accomplished by making all of the cuts subpially. 
Studies of the electrophysiological activity of such isolated cortex in situ have 
been reported. The basic method involved introducing a narrow curved blade 
through an opening in an avascular area of the pia-arachnoid membrane. This 
could undercut a block or slab of cortex and, by bringing its tip up to meet 
the pia at some distance away, also cut the connetions to adjacent cortex. […] 
If stimulation of the isolated cortical slab can elicit an introspective report by 
the subject, that could only come about if the CMF could activate the appropriate 
cerebral areas required to produce the verbal report. (Libet 1994, 121–124)
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Clearly, it would take much to convince any candidate to undergo such 
excision, which renders the experiment almost unfeasible. Philosophically, it 
resulted in numerous accusations against Libet of supporting a naïve Carte-
sian dualism. The analytic philosophical tradition engaged most prominently 
with the scientific discourses on these issues, for example in the writings of 
John Searle, who discusses some discoveries in neuroscience to develop his 
own approach to consciousness. Searle affirms that the Cartesian notions of 
‘mind’ and ‘body’, the explananda in Libet’s experiments, are obsolete cate-
gories from an old philosophy, which need to be rejected in favour of a type 
of non-reductive materialism. Within the phenomenological tradition, Dan 
Zahavi and his colleague Shaun Gallagher openly engage with contemporary 
neuroscience and cognitive science as well. As in the case of Searle, they also 
reject Cartesian dualism, claiming that instead of explaining how the mind 
interacts with the body, phenomenology overcomes Cartesian dualism by 
changing the focus and presenting the notion of the embodied self.
Acknowledging that this is certainly a complex question, perhaps one 
of the most difficult problems in philosophy and theology, the goal of this 
paper is to analyse critically these two different anti-Cartesian approaches to 
the problem of consciousness and body, creating a dialogue between Searle 
and Zahavi, who represent the analytic and the phenomenological traditions 
respectively, in the hope of building a bridge between these approaches. 
I will focus on the notion of consciousness and self-consciousness. Following 
Zahavi, I hold that a phenomenological approach to consciousness can offer 
a complementing alternative to the contemporary analytic understanding 
of the nature of consciousness and self-consciousness. In addition to 
analysing these claims, I will evaluate whether his phenomenological 
approach opens the possibility of overcoming the current materialist cast of 
Searle’s philosophy of mind, allowing for the possibility of a non-reductive 
comprehension of human beings.
The strategy followed is three-fold. First, I will frame the notion of 
consciousness in the mind/body problem as presented by Searle. This step 
will also include an analysis of Searle’s understanding of the structure of 
consciousness, which arises from his willingness to overcome both Cartesian 
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dualism and eliminative materialism (or reductive materialism, as he also 
calls it – Searle 2004, 56) in dialogue with contemporary neuroscience. 
Afterwards, I will turn my attention to Zahavi’s phenomenological approach. 
Even though he does not directly engage with the debate over the materiality 
or immateriality of consciousness, as Searle does, he engages with the 
debate concerning Cartesian dualism. Hence, I will present his views on 
consciousness as an embodied self-consciousness, which imply that it is not 
an object among other objects in the world. As I will explain, Zahavi embraces 
this notion of consciousness to give way to the possibility of a world full of 
meaningful objects. Finally, I will argue that, even if Zahavi does not engage 
in ontological questions about consciousness, his account leaves a path open 
to understanding it in non-material terms, while being intrinsically related 
to the body, overcoming, thus, an extrinsic Cartesian dualism.
1. Searle’s non-reductive materialism
Throughout much of his work, John Searle approaches consciousness by 
engaging with scientific discoveries and developing his own naturalistic 
perspective. Against many scientists, including Libet, he holds that con-
sciousness “is not a hypothesis that has to be tested but a datum that has to 
be explained” (Searle 2001, 63). Indeed, according to Searle, the question is 
not whether consciousness exists but “how brain processes cause a conscious 
field and how such experiences are realized in the brain” (Searle 2001, 63). 
Thus, there is no need for proving the existence of consciousness, since 
we experience it, but to explain the experience of its existence. Searle’s 
problem with Libet’s outlook is that he postulates a non-physical CMF. Even 
though Libet understands CMF to emerge from neural activity, he claims 
that it belongs to a subjective non-physical realm: “The putative CMF would 
not be in any category of known physical fields, such as electromagnetic, 
gravitational, etc. The conscious mental field would be in a phenomenolog-
ically independent category; it is not describable in terms of any externally 
observable physical events or of any known physical theory as presented 
constituted” (Libet 1994, 120).
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Searle’s main concern is that Libet evidently embraces dualism: “[Libet] 
thinks that in recognizing the unified character of normal conscious expe-
riences we are postulating the existence of something ‘non-physical’, we 
are postulating some weird Cartesian entity with separate causal powers, 
not a part of the ordinary, ‘physical’, biological world” (Searle 2001, 63). 
Instead, Searle proposes a new way of understanding the relation between 
consciousness and the brain that would, in some way, overcome this naïve 
dualism. His claim is that Libet, together with all philosophies of mind 
(all –isms, he says), bases his views on a wrong assumption, namely the 
distinction between the mental and the physical or material (Searle 2001, 
1–3). Consciousness is, for Searle, a biological process as any other, which 
presents certain specific features that allow him to distance himself from 
reductive materialism, as I will show briefly.
Searle complains that philosophy of mind typically offers two options: 
one can either be a dualist or an eliminative materialist (in any of its alter-
natives: functionalism, behaviourism, etc). The problem is that both dualism 
and materialism accept the traditional vocabulary of ‘mind’ and ‘body’. 
Searle simply rejects the use of this obsolete vocabulary, implying thus 
the rejection of both dualism and reductive materialism. On the one hand, 
he rejects dualism because he considers the postulation of a non-physical 
mental realm to be both unnecessary and contradictory to what we know 
about the way the universe functions. On the other, he rejects eliminative 
materialism, because it denies the existence of some essential features of 
the mind, such as consciousness and intentionality.
Instead, Searle suggests embracing a non-reductive materialism. He 
claims to provide a naturalistic solution to the mind/body problem, holding 
that mental states are biological processes going on in our brains, simulta-
neously accepting the existence of qualitativeness, subjectivity, unity, and 
intentionality, among other essential features of consciousness (Searle 2004, 
93–110, where he describes eleven of these essential features of conscious-
ness). Searle calls his solution a ‘biological naturalism’, the principal goal of 
which is to “abandon the assumptions behind the traditional vocabulary” 
(Searle 2004, 73). The main assumption that we have to overcome, Searle 
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clarifies, is that which holds that ‘mental’ and ‘physical’ are categories that 
exclude each other (Searle 2004, 76). Once one realises that there is no deep 
metaphysical distinction between them, the apparent problem of the mind/
body interaction is solved. Moreover, once one understands the underlying 
biological process, the mystery is over:
It should seem no more mysterious, in principle, that this hunk of matter, this 
grey and white oatmeal-textured substance of the brain, should be conscious 
than it seems mysterious that this other hunk of matter, this collection of 
nucleo-protein molecules stuck onto a calcium frame, should be alive. The 
way, in short, to dispel the mystery is to understand the process. We do not yet 
fully understand the process, but we understand their general character. (Searle 
1984, p. 24. See also Searle 1992, 100, and 2004, 80–82)
The mystery of the living body is for Searle similar to the mystery of the 
conscious brain, both of which will be solved when science fully discovers 
their respective underlying processes. As part of the physical world, 
consciousness is caused by lower-level physical processes, which in this 
case are neurological processes that occur in the brain: “Consciousness 
is a system-level, biological feature in much the same way that digestion, 
or growth, or the secretion of bile are system level, biological features. 
As such, consciousness is a feature of the brain and thus a part of the 
physical world” (Searle 2004, 80). The key for Searle is that even though 
consciousness is a physical reality, there is no contradiction in saying 
that it is subjective, qualitative, and intentional. Hence, these features 
are, as well, part of the domain of the natural sciences. Nonetheless, 
neither consciousness nor its features can be ontologically reduced to 
a non-subjective reality, even though they can be causally reduced, i.e. 
explained by their neuronal substrate. This claim does not intend to show 
a “deep metaphysical asymmetry” (Searle 2004, 85), but it wants to affirm 
that consciousness has a first-person ontology that cannot be reduced to 
a third-person perspective.
In summary, Searle’s position amounts to affirming the irreducible 
subjectivity of consciousness side by side the physicality of all human 
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existence. A similar account has also been suggested, with its own distinctive 
features, by phenomenology. Within this tradition, Zahavi is today one of its 
most prominent proponents, building dialogical bridges with neuroscience 
and the analytic tradition. I will now turn my attention to his ideas, as to 
elucidate his notion of consciousness and assess its merits in overcoming 
Cartesian dualism without reducing consciousness to biological processes.
2. An alternative phenomenological approach
Among phenomenologists familiar with Zahavi’s work, many would won-
der the reasons for introducing his phenomenological approach to the 
discussion of the mind/body problem and the nature of consciousness. 
After all, Zahavi is explicit when claiming that metaphysical discussions 
distort the object under study when phenomenology engages with the 
problem of consciousness. Indeed, he holds that the starting point of many 
philosophers and theologians consists in describing metaphysical positions. 
In fact, Zahavi and Gallagher affirm that “one of the underlying ideas of 
phenomenology is that the preoccupation with these metaphysical issues 
tends to degenerate into highly technical and abstract discussions that 
lose touch with the real subject matter: experience” (Gallagher & Zahavi 
2008, 9). Phenomenology, instead, is mainly concerned with a description 
of the “experiential structure of our mental/embodied life” (Gallagher 
& Zahavi 2008, 9), from a first-person perspective. Moreover, phenome-
nology, they claim, is not interested in giving a naturalistic explanation 
of consciousness, but neither is it interested in rejecting its importance: 
“Don’t we have to know whether we are studying the mind, or the brain, or 
whether it is something material or immaterial? ... Phenomenologists do 
not deny it, nor do they affirm it. They suspend these kinds of questions 
and all judgements about them. They start with experience” (Gallagher & 
Zahavi 2008, 7).
Moreover, as a good analytic philosopher, Searle also rejects using 
phenomenology to address ontological questions: “The phenomenological 
approach is inadequate to solve the problems that bother me. For me the 
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phenomenological data are typically useful at the beginning of the inves-
tigation, logical analysis has to go far beyond phenomenology” (Searle 
2001/2002, 277). Searle claims that phenomenology has severe limitations 
given that it only provides a description of how things seem to me here 
and now, while he is interested in analysing their ontology, i.e. what is the 
nature of consciousness. 
So, again, why introducing Dan Zahavi’s views? In brief, because I think 
that he can offer valuable insights, which Zahavi himself might not have 
seen, concerning the ontological questions about the nature of conscious-
ness, while at the same time changing the focus of the mind/body problem 
away from Cartesian considerations. Starting from experience, i.e. the 
phenomenon as it appears to us, suspending any influential metaphysical or 
theoretical framework, and following fully the phenomenological method as 
it was taught by Husserl, in particular the third step of the method, namely 
the eidetic variation, I believe that Zahavi’s understanding of consciousness 
might open a path for the consideration of a non-material realm in human 
beings. Thus, I will present his views on consciousness, in order to offer 
my views on this matter.
Zahavi begins his analysis of consciousness establishing the relationship 
between consciousness and self-consciousness. One must not identify 
self-consciousness with something that occurs only when one pays attention 
to conscious life. Rather, every conscious experience contains a structural 
minimal form of self-consciousness. This means that there is a “constitutive 
link between experiential phenomena and first-personal givenness or acces-
sibility” (Zahavi 2005, 12), i.e., every conscious experience is my experience 
because it has an undeniable first-person perspective: “insofar as there 
is something it is like for the subject to have the experience, the subject 
must in some way have access to and be acquainted with the experience” 
(Zahavi 2005, 15). In fact, we are acquainted with our own subjectivity in 
a way completely different from how we are acquainted with objects. Thus, 
we can have various different experiences of different things, but all these 
experiences have in common that they have a ‘mineness’ quality, i.e. they 
are experienced as mine. Furthermore, I do not possess those experiences as 
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I possess external objects: “the for-me-ness in question is not a quality like 
yellow, salty, or spongy. It doesn’t refer to a specific content of experience, 
to a specific what, but to the unique mode of givenness or how of experience. 
It refers to the first-personal presence of experience; it refers to the fact 
that experiences I am living through present themselves differently (but 
not necessarily better) to me than to anybody else” (Gallagher & Zahavi 
2008, 57). Experiences, thus, present themselves in a perspectival sense, in 
a distinctive manner to the experiencing subject.
Moreover, following Jean-Paul Sartre, Zahavi holds that this self-con-
sciousness (or self-awareness, as many phenomenologists speak) must 
not be mistaken for an additional mental state such as reflection or intro-
spection, but should be accepted as an intrinsic feature of primary experi-
ence. Whereas in reflection consciousness takes itself as the object, in the 
primary self-awareness (which Sartre calls pre-reflective self-awareness), 
consciousness has a non-objectifying self-awareness. Reflection, which is 
a derived self-awareness, always presupposes pre-reflective self-awareness. 
Thus, consciousness has no need of reflection for being acquainted with 
itself. Zahavi gives an example to illustrate this idea. Suppose, he says, that 
you are reading a book, and that someone interrupts you to ask what you 
are doing. Even though your attention has not been focused on yourself 
nor in the activity of reading but in the story itself, you can answer ‘I am 
reading’. The reason for that, he holds, is that during your activity, you 
have been conscious of yourself all along. For Searle, on the contrary, even 
if he postulates a first-person ontology in the sense that a subject always 
experiences mental phenomena, he rejects the phenomenological notion 
of self-consciousness. For Searle, to be self-conscious is to have a kind of 
reflection, is to turn the attention to the state itself. Therefore, not every 
conscious event is self-conscious (Searle 2004, 142–149). Nonetheless, Zahavi 
affirms that having a primitive and fundamental pre-reflective consciousness 
is having a ‘what it is like’ experience that refers to a subject, which, using 
Searle’s terminology, is to claim a first-person ontology.
David Rosenthal objected the assertion that there is an intrinsic feature 
belonging to the primary experience (Rosenthal 1993, 157). Rosenthal argued 
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that to postulate self-consciousness as an intrinsic feature is to postulate an 
‘unanalysable’ and ‘mysterious’ feature that cannot be studied scientifically 
nor theoretically. Zahavi’s answer to this objection will allow me to assess the 
possibility of a naturalistic interpretation of consciousness, which basically 
refers to Searle’s own programme. When discussing the postulation of the 
intrinsic pre-reflective self-consciousness, Zahavi asks:
Is a one-level account of consciousness committed to some kind of supernatural 
dualism? Not at all. One can defend the notion of pre-reflective self-conscious-
ness while remaining quite neutral vis-à-vis the issue of naturalization. More 
specifically, nothing in the rejection of a relational account of consciousness 
rules it out that the emergence of consciousness requires a requisite neural 
substratum… It might even be argued that the one-level account is… in better 
accordance with a popular view in neuroscience, according to which conscious-
ness is a matter of hitting a certain threshold of neural activity. (Gallagher 
& Zahavi 2008, 63)
The key word in this statement is ‘neutral’. Following this neutrality, it 
might be claimed, on the one hand, that this view of consciousness is in 
accordance with a naturalisation of consciousness, but, on the other hand, 
it might also be claimed that it is not. I am inclined to favour this second 
option, and I am also inclined to say that Zahavi’s ideas might allow me to 
conclude this way. Recurring to the idea that consciousness is not another 
object in the world, I will show why I believe this statement to be true.
Zahavi holds that “any assessment of the possibility of reducing con-
sciousness to neuronal structures and any appraisal of whether a natu-
ralization of consciousness is possible will require a detailed analysis and 
description of the experiential aspects of consciousness” (Zahavi 2005, 4). 
This means that, if we want to reduce consciousness to neuronal processes, 
we first need to understand what we are reducing. According to Zahavi, 
phenomenologists claim that consciousness is not an object among others 
in the world, given that consciousness has an active role in the giving of 
meaning to things that appear to it. Consciousness is, Zahavi explains, 
“a necessary (though not sufficient) condition of possibility for any entity 
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to appear as an object in the way it does and with the meaning it has” 
(Gallagher & Zahavi 2008, 27). In this way, consciousness is distinguished 
from the objects of the world. Because of this specific characteristic of 
consciousness, Zahavi argues that phenomenologists do not attempt to 
find a place for consciousness in nature:
The phenomenological investigation of consciousness is not motivated by the 
wish to find a place for consciousness within an already well-established mate-
rialistic or naturalistic framework. In fact, the very attempt to do so, assuming 
that consciousness is merely yet another object in the world, would prevent 
one from discovering and clarifying some of the most interesting aspects of 
consciousness, including the true epistemic and ontological significance of 
the first-person perspective. The question of consciousness should not be 
addressed on the background of an unquestioned objectivism. Too frequently 
the assumption has been that a better understanding of the physical world 
will allow us a better understanding of consciousness. (Gallagher & Zahavi 
2008, 28)
Therefore, if consciousness is not like any other object in the world, a se-
rious analysis of consciousness cannot be restricted to a neurobiological 
approach, as Searle pretends to do: “the neurobiological attempts to solve 
the scientific problem of consciousness… this is exactly the right approach” 
(Searle 2004, 105). Thus, even though Searle wants to retain many features 
of consciousness, including subjectivity, I believe that he is mistaken when 
he thinks that a complete science of the brain will resolve the mind/body 
problem and will give us a complete account of what consciousness is. Con-
sciousness, as Zahavi and other phenomenologists argue, is not a thing that 
can be classified among the physical objects of the world. Consciousness is 
our access to the world, is what gives meaning to the objects that manifest 
and present themselves: “consciousness constitutes the way in which the 
world appears as meaningful” (Gallagher & Zahavi 2008, 26). If we reduce 
the study of consciousness to a physical/biological explanation, how can we 
explain that neurons give meaning to things? Ultimately, how can a material 
res give meaning to objects?
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3. Towards a non-materialistic overcoming  
of Cartesian dualism
If consciousness is not a thing among objects in the world, can we speak 
in any meaningful way of an immaterial consciousness? The key issue in 
answering this question is whether an affirmative reply implies Cartesian 
dualism. I believe it does not. The main problem with Cartesian dualism is 
that it understands the mind/body relation in terms of an extrinsic relation 
between two distinct substances. This is the problem Libet tries to solve 
when he explains how the non-physical mind relates and interacts with 
the brain. Searle reacts to it eliminating the Cartesian res cogitans, while 
retaining the term ‘mind’. Keeping the Cartesian res extensa (i.e. the material 
or physical thing that falls under the field of study of the natural sciences, 
such as physics, chemistry, or biology which, following Searle’s grounding 
of this notion in contemporary physical conceptions, can be understood as 
essentially belonging to space and time, and explained by microphysics), 
Searle expands its features by characterising it as a subjective, qualitative, 
and intentional matter. I want to argue that, even if Searle changes the 
very notion of res extensa, his thought still remains constrained within 
the framework of the dualist/materialist long-standing debate. Indeed, he 
understands the relation between a non-material mind and the body as an 
extrinsic and imposed relation, forcing him to think in Cartesian terms, even 
if his notion of body differs from that of Descartes’. Ultimately, this framework 
prevents Searle from fulfilling his goal of overcoming the debate as a whole.
What I propose, following Zahavi’s phenomenological approach, is to 
change the focus of the mind/body problem. The phenomenological method 
replaces the notions of ‘mind’ and ‘body’ (“obsolete vocabulary”, according 
to Searle, “derivations and abstractions”, according to Zahavi, given that the 
subject does not identify neither with her consciousness nor with her body in 
isolation) with the notion of ‘embodiment’, thus presenting a completely new 
paradigm in the discussion. Whereas most analytic philosophers, including 
Searle, begin the mind/body discussion presenting the different metaphysical 
alternatives and taking sides, Zahavi holds that “phenomenology pushes 
5(2)/2017 167
DA N ZA H AV I A N D J O H N S E A R L E. . .
these kinds of questions aside, brackets them, sets them out of play, and asks 
us instead to pay attention to the phenomenon under study” (Gallagher & 
Zahavi 2008, 6). As I explained above, the starting point of phenomenology 
is experience, which ultimately is an experience that unquestionably refers 
to the body, an embodied experience.
As with consciousness, the own body is not experienced as an object 
among other objects in the world. Following the teachings of Husserl, who 
distinguished between Körper (the objective body) and Leib (the lived body), 
paradigmatically appropriated by Merleau-Ponty’s distinction between le corps 
objectif and le corps vécu, phenomenologists argue that there are two ways 
in which we can experience our own body. First, we can experience it from 
a third-person perspective, as from the outside. Second, from an embodied 
first-person perspective. While the former perceives the body as an object, 
subject for example to the study of the natural sciences, the latter is focused 
on the experienced body, as it appears to phenomenological investigation.
Zahavi explains that the lived body is perceived as “the body as subject, 
as experiencer, as agent, rather than the body as object, as thing experienced 
– this is a basic distinction missed by the Cartesian tradition” (Gallagher 
& Zahavi 2008, 155). Thus, whereas Descartes believes that he can think 
without his body, because he is not his body, for phenomenology the body 
itself structures experience. We are embodied beings, and our body shapes 
our being-in-the-world. In addition to being involved in our relation to 
the world, our body is also involved in our relation to others. Indeed, our 
encounter with the other, the possibility of our mutual interaction, is only 
possible because of our embodied subjectivity. In fact, the other is perceived 
not as a mere body, but as another embodied subject, precisely because of my 
own embodied conscious experience. As Zahavi explains “we should avoid 
construing the mind as something visible to only one person and invisible 
to everyone else. The mind is not something exclusively inner, something 
cut off from the body and the surrounding world” (Zahavi 2005, 152). Thus, 
we perceive the other as a unified whole, i.e. as a conscious body.
With this kind of argumentation phenomenology opposes and rejects 
Cartesian dualism. Nonetheless, Zahavi argues that “this does not entail 
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an endorsement of some kind of Cartesian materialism” either. In fact, he 
continues, “it is not as if the phenomenological way to ‘overcome’ dualism 
is by retaining the distinction between mind and body, and then simply 
getting rid of the mind. Rather, the notion of embodiment, the notion of an 
embodied mind or a minded body, is meant to replace the ordinary notions of 
mind and body” (Gallagher & Zahavi 2008, 153). Therefore, phenomenology 
rejects the very distinction of res cogitans and res extensa, where the body is 
seen as a mere object and not as a constituent feature of our conscious self.
Zahavi does not go further than that. In fact, he avoids any mention 
of an immaterial realm in human beings. Probably due to his interests 
in engaging in dialogue with analytic philosophy of mind, in particular 
with Searle, Zahavi misses the opportunity to follow through the path he 
prepared with his phenomenological account of the conscious body. This 
shortcoming allows Searle to formulate his critique of phenomenology, 
namely that phenomenologists are not interested in ontological questions. 
In Zahavi’s case, I believe this critique to be accurate. Nevertheless, when 
Husserl introduced the eidetic variation in his phenomenological method, 
he presented it as “a way that would draw out the essential and invariant 
characteristics of the things that we experience” (Gallagher & Zahavi 2008, 
30). It is in this final step where I think that phenomenology, starting with 
experience, opens itself to ontological questions.
Following Husserl’s method, phenomenology must formulate the ques-
tion about these essential and invariant features of consciousness, what 
I consider to be the core set of properties that remain despite change. There 
must be some essential features of human consciousness, at which one can 
arrive subtracting the variable characteristics. Within those core features, 
consciousness must be either material or immaterial. This is the ultimate 
question that Zahavi fails to address, as I said, probably due to his reluctance 
to be rejected by the analytic philosophers. If, then, phenomenology is 
a valuable method to overcome Cartesian dualism without getting rid of an 
immaterial mind, how should we conceive of this immaterial consciousness? 
Indeed, phenomenology rejects Cartesian dualism understood in terms of an 
extrinsic relation between two completely distinct res, as in the case of Libet. 
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But, would it make sense to affirm the existence of both realities internally 
and intrinsically related to each other, without the need of reducing the mind 
to biological processes, as Searle does? I believe that phenomenology allows 
us to consider this possibility. The key notions are the ‘lived body’, i.e. the 
‘own body’, and the ‘meaning-giving’ capacity of consciousness. The former 
would become where man’s material and spiritual realms are intrinsically 
unified, implying their embodied unity. This lived body, which is a conscious 
body, is our access to the world and to the other, who is also perceived as an 
embodied subject, another conscious body. This perception of the other can 
only be achieved if the other is also perceived as meaningful, in the sense 
that it appears to be an intentional self capable also of providing things with 
meaning, precisely because she is also a conscious body. It is in examining 
this feature of our own consciousness, which first understands others as 
conscious and meaningful, where we can see that our consciousness also 
gives meaning to objects, which are not ‘others’, in the sense that objects, 
as well as ‘others’, appear to us in a certain way, according to our own 
first-person perspective. Thus, if we as embodied consciousness can give 
meaning to objects, it seems that this embodied consciousness cannot be 
of the same fabric of non-conscious objects. Hence, the meaning-giving 
capacity of these embodied subjects appears to refer to some non-material 
(non-objective) realm, in which our consciousness exists.
Conclusion
Starting from Searle’s critique of Libet’s Cartesian dualism and his account 
of non-reductive materialism, I suggested that his discussion remains con-
strained within a Cartesian framework, rendering his efforts unsuccessful, 
due to the fact that he thinks the relation between mind and body in any 
dualistic account as an extrinsic kind of relation. Thus he reduces the res 
cogitans to a res extensa with extra features, naturalising consciousness in 
terms of biological and neuronal processes. I proposed studying Zahavi’s 
phenomenological take on consciousness as a way to re-consider Searle’s 
position and to overcome Cartesian dualism. Zahavi’s account offers a view 
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of consciousness that features an emphasis on the lived body and on it not 
being another object in the world. Even if Zahavi does not allow himself to 
continue his analysis of these ideas, hence not dealing with the question 
on the materiality or immateriality of consciousness, I argued that this is 
a valid and fruitful path to follow. Indeed, I suggested that these features 
permit to think of consciousness as something that is essentially irreduc-
ible to objective matter, even if it is intrinsically related to it, offering the 
possibility of interpreting it as belonging to a non-material realm, without 
rendering this position an extrinsic Cartesian dualism.
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